Hikvision and Dahua are not just cameras. They are part of China’s military-technological infrastructure that has already been used to adjust Russian strikes on Ukraine.
In 2022–2023, direct YouTube livestreams from Ukrainian Hikvision and Dahua cameras began appearing en masse in Ukrainian cities: viewers could see where missiles were landing, how equipment was moving, and how lights were going out at critical infrastructure sites. And this data could be watched not only by random viewers — but also by those planning further strikes.
The livestreams were broadcast not only for Ukrainian or Russian audiences, but also internationally, serving as a tool of intimidation: “Look how quickly Russian weapons are wiping Ukraine off the face of the earth.”
At that moment, the Don’t Fund Russian Army (DFRA) initiative began to act — documenting such cases, seeking takedowns, and contacting government institutions. This is how a three-year chronology of official letters and appeals began, showing that today all key Ukrainian security and law-enforcement bodies have officially recognized the risks associated with Chinese Hikvision and Dahua equipment.
In September 2023 and January 2024, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) officially warned the government twice that the use of Hikvision and Dahua equipment is dangerous. The warnings referred to the risk of unauthorized access to video data and the potential use of these systems for intelligence purposes.
The SBU informed the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine about the dangers of using Hikvision equipment in its letters dated 23 September 2022 No. 99/179dsk and 19 January 2024 No. 4/88dsk. In response, the Cabinet issued corresponding directives dated 9 November 2022 No. 1058/1/1-22dsk and 13 February 2024 No. 166/1/1-24dsk to the relevant executive authorities.
The National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) also stated that Hikvision and Dahua equipment poses a direct threat to national security in its letter to the Cabinet dated 7 June 2024.
Considering the identified national security threats, in June 2024 the NSDC Secretariat sent a letter to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (dated 07.06.2024 No. 2033/11-09/2-24), on the basis of which the Secretariat of the Cabinet instructed authorized state bodies (letter dated 10.06.2024 No. 1328/0/2-24) to examine the issue. In response to this instruction, several government bodies replied that they “have no authority to resolve the issues raised” (the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Digital Transformation), or that they “support the position of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,” which proposes continuing the procurement of technical systems produced by Hikvision and Dahua (the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine — SSSCIP).
Shortly after, on 10 July 2024, the NSDC sent a letter to the Prime Minister of Ukraine, stating the following regarding Hikvision and Dahua surveillance cameras:
- Ukrainian intelligence services acknowledge that the hardware and software may enable the enemy to access sensitive security and defense information.
- According to assessments by the Foreign Intelligence Service (SZR) and the Defense Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense (HUR), Hikvision and Dahua hardware systems make it impossible to guarantee the security of data stored and processed within such systems.
While monitoring threats to Ukraine’s national security, the NSDC Secretariat identified preconditions for harm to national interests due to the use of surveillance systems produced by foreign companies — specifically Chinese companies Hikvision and Dahua — by law-enforcement bodies, government authorities, and public administration.
According to Ukrainian intelligence services, the hardware and related software may allow the enemy to access sensitive security and defense information, creating significant risks for the state.
According to the SZR and HUR, Hikvision and Dahua equipment operating via the internet cannot ensure the security of data collected and processed within such systems. Currently, Hikvision and Dahua cameras and related software continue to be used in surveillance systems along the Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-Belarusian borders, in the “Safe City” system, in regional systems of the National Police, and in the Main Situation Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its regional units.
Given that the issue requires comprehensive consideration and state-level measures, the NSDC proposed that the government designate an executive authority responsible for addressing this matter and providing recommendations to government bodies and local authorities regarding the procurement of communication equipment, surveillance systems, and corresponding software while considering security concerns, sanctions, and national security risks.
It was also considered advisable to establish an interagency working group to develop proposals for regulating the procurement and use of video equipment and software from foreign companies. Based on its results, the government should adopt measures to prevent harm to national security and defense.
As seen from the letter, the NSDC proposed that the Cabinet appoint a responsible body to handle this issue and create an interagency working group to draft proposals for restricting the circulation of Hikvision and Dahua cameras in procurement processes.
The State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection (SSSCIP) also acknowledged the issue on 26 June 2024 and agreed with the position of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the need to establish legal mechanisms to ban the procurement of Hikvision and Dahua cameras.
The SSSCIP Administration agreed with the proposal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs regarding the need to consider restricting the use and procurement of products and software by Hikvision Digital Technology Co., Ltd and Zhejiang Dahua Technology Co., Ltd (People’s Republic of China) and to develop legal mechanisms to prohibit such procurement.
On 14 February 2025, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) stated in a letter to the SSSCIP that Hikvision and Dahua equipment poses a threat to cybersecurity and to the protection of Ukraine’s critical information infrastructure.
Since the use of Hikvision and Dahua products may potentially affect cybersecurity, critical information infrastructure, and the protection of state information resources, the issue goes beyond the sphere of electronic communications. The SSSCIP, which has the necessary competencies and authority to assess security risks, could be the main body responsible for deciding on the possibility of using or procuring Hikvision and Dahua equipment by government authorities. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine supports the position of the NSDC Secretariat regarding the creation of an interagency working group to develop proposals for regulating the procurement and use of video equipment and software from foreign companies, particularly within government bodies. Given the above, we propose that the SSSCIP consider forming the aforementioned interagency working group and confirm our readiness to participate in its work.
All these official conclusions point to one thing: the danger has been recognized at the highest levels of Ukraine’s security and law-enforcement institutions.
However, while the SBU, NSDC, SSSCIP, and MIA acknowledge the national security risks, executive authorities continue to respond with “this is not within our mandate,” “we are waiting for instructions,” “there is no regulatory framework,” — while Chinese Hikvision and Dahua cameras continue to pass through customs and enter state facilities via public tenders.
While executive bodies engage in bureaucratic “ping-pong,” the Don’t Fund Russian Army (DFRA) team systematically monitors and counteracts the large-scale influx of Chinese equipment into state structures through public procurement.
In 2024, DFRA detected 634 tenders involving Hikvision and Dahua equipment. The result: 141 agreements were canceled or the equipment was replaced with other brands, and 287 customers officially refused further procurement of these products.
In 2025, DFRA continued its monitoring. As of September 2025, 583 new tenders for Hikvision and Dahua cameras had been recorded. Due to DFRA’s efforts, 124 contracts were canceled, and 233 procuring entities confirmed they would no longer purchase Hikvision or Dahua products.
These are not just numbers — they are the result of extensive advocacy work, hundreds of letters and appeals, analytical reports, and communication with government authorities.
Thus, in just two years, DFRA helped save more than 14 million hryvnias for the state budget and prevented the installation of hundreds of potentially dangerous cameras in government structures.
Now, when every new tender involving Hikvision or Dahua is tracked and publicly highlighted, it is no longer just a “technical procurement” — it is a test of responsibility. Because in wartime, ignoring such risks may come at far too high a price.
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